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Abstract—We investigate the problem of the predictability
of random variable Y under a privacy constraint dictated by
random variable X , correlated with Y , where both predictabil-
ity and privacy are assessed in terms of the minimum mean-
squared error (MMSE). Given that X and Y are connected via
a binary-input symmetric-output (BISO) channel, we derive the
optimal random mapping PZ∣Y such that the MMSE of Y given
Z is minimized while the MMSE of X given Z is greater than
(1−ε)var(X) for a given ε ≥ 0. We also consider the case where
(X,Y ) are continuous and PZ∣Y is restricted to be an additive
noise channel.
Index Terms—Data privacy, equivocation, rate-privacy func-
tion, information theory, MMSE and additive channels, mutual
information, maximal correlation.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider two communicating agents Alice and Bob. Alice
observes a random variable Y and wants to reveal it to Bob in
order to receive a payoff. On the other hand, nature chooses
X , dependent on Y via a fixed channel PX ∣Y . Alice wishes
to disclose Y as accurately as possible, but in such a way
that X is kept almost private from Bob. For instance, Y
may represent the information that a social network (Alice)
obtains from its users and X may represent political prefer-
ences of the users. Alice wants to disclose Y as accurately
as possible to an advertising company and, simultaneously,
wishes to protect the privacy of its users. Given a fixed joint
distribution PXY , Alice, hence, needs to choose a random
mapping PZ∣Y , the so-called privacy filter, to release a new
random variable Z , called the displayed data, such that X
and Z satisfy a privacy constraint and Z maximizes a utility
function (corresponding to the predictability of Y ).
This problem has been addressed from an information-
theoretic viewpoint in [2]–[4], [6], [16], [17], [20], [22],
[29] where both utility and privacy are measured in terms
of information-theoretic quantities. In particular, in [2] non-
trivial perfect privacy for discrete X and Y where Z is
required to be statistically independent of X and dependent
on Y , is studied. It is shown that non-trivial perfect privacy is
possible if and only if X is weakly independent of Y , that is,
if the set of vectors {PX ∣Y (⋅) ∶ y ∈ Y} is linearly dependent.
Calmon et al. [6] showed that X is weakly independent of Y
if and only if the smallest singular value of the conditional
expectation operator f ↦ E[f(X)∣Y ] is zero and hence
obtained an equivalent necessary and sufficient condition of
non-trivial perfect privacy.
In this paper, we take an estimation-theoretic approach and
define both the privacy and utility functions in terms of the
minimum mean-squared error (MMSE). For a given pair of
random variables (U,V ), the MMSE of estimating U given
V is
mmse(U ∣V ) ∶= inf
g∈B(R)
E[(U − g(V ))2]
= E[(U −E[U ∣V ])2] = E[var(U ∣V )],
where B(R) denotes the collection of all Borel measurable1
functions on the real line and var(⋅∣⋅) denotes the conditional
variance. The privacy filter PZ∣Y is said to satisfy the ε-
strong estimation privacy condition if mmse(f(X)∣Y ) ≥(1 − ε)var(f(X)) for any Borel function2 f of X and
some ε ≥ 0 and similarly, it is said to satisfy the ε-weak
estimation privacy condition if mmse(X ∣Y ) ≥ (1−ε)var(X).
The parameter ε determines the level of desired privacy; in
particular, ε = 0 corresponds to perfect privacy. We propose
to use the estimation noise to signal ratio (ENSR), defined
by mmse(Y ∣Z)
var(Y )
, as the loss function associated with Y and
Z . The goal is to choose PZ∣Y which satisfies the strong
(resp., weak) estimation privacy condition and minimizes the
ENSR (or equivalently maximizes var(Y )
mmse(Y ∣Z)
as the utility
function), which ensures the best predictability of Y given
a privacy-preserving Z . The function sENSRε(X ;Y ) (resp.,
wENSRε(X ;Y )) is introduced as this minimum to quantify
the above goal.
To evaluate sENSRε(X ;Y ), we first show that the ε-strong
estimation privacy condition is equivalent to ρ2m(X ;Y ) ≤
ε where ρm is the maximal correlation. We then show
that sENSRε(X ;Y ) and wENSRε(X ;Y ) admit closed-form
expressions when PX ∣Y is a binary-input and symmetric-
output (BISO) channel. Moreover, when X is discrete, we
develop a bound characterizing the privacy-constrained error
probability, Pr(Yˆ (Z) ≠ Y ), for all estimators Yˆ (Z) given
a privacy-preserving Z , thus generalizing the results of
[7]. In particular, we show that the fundamental bound on
privacy-constrained error probability decreases linearly as ε
increases, analogously to [7, Corollaries 3,5].
We also study sENSRε(Xn;Y n) when n i.i.d. copies(Xn, Y n) of (X,Y ) are available. It is intuitively clear from
the Slepian-Wolf theorem that non-trivial perfect privacy is
1As pointed out in [26], we need to restrict the minimization to the
collection of Borel measurable estimators g. It is possible to construct a
nonmeasurable transformation gˆ yielding a random variable gˆ(V ) which is
equal to U pointwise but mmse(U ∣V ) = var(U) > 0.
2This is reminiscent of semantic security [13] in the cryptography
community. An encryption mechanism is said to be semantically secure if
the adversary’s advantage for correctly guessing any function of the privata
data given an observation of the mechanism’s output (i.e., the ciphertext) is
required to be negligible.
always possible for (Xn, Y n) with sufficiently large n irre-
spective of the perfect privacy associated with (X,Y ). This
observation is formalized by Calmon et al. [6] by showing
that, unless X is a deterministic function of Y , the smallest
singular value of the operator f(Xn) ↦ E[f(Xn∣Y n)]
converges to zero as n → ∞, and hence non-trivial perfect
privacy is possible for sufficiently large n. However, we
demonstrate that if the class of privacy filters is constrained
to be memoryless, then the situation drastically changes
and sENSRε(Xn;Y n) remains the same for any n. This
is reminiscent of the tensorization property for the maximal
correlation proved in [27].
In addition, sENSRε(X ;Y ) is considered for the case
where (X,Y ) has a joint probability density function by
studying the problem where the displayed data Z is obtained
by passing Y through an additive-noise channel. In this case,
we show that for a Gaussian noise process, jointly Gaussian(XG, YG) is the worst case (i.e., has the largest ENSR). We
also show that if YG is Gaussian then the ENSR of (X,YG) is
very close to the Gaussian ENSR if the maximal correlation
between X and YG is close to the correlation coefficient
between X and YG. It is important to note that maximal
correlation is weakly lower semi-continuous, and hence the
fact that ρ2m(X ;YG) is close to ρ2(X ;YG) does not necessary
mean that X is Gaussian.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we formally formulate the problem in terms of the strong
and weak estimation privacy conditions and obtain some
equivalent formulations. In Section III, we focus on discrete(X,Y ) and derive some properties for the corresponding
utility-privacy functions and then calculate sENSRε(X ;Y )
and wENSRε(X ;Y ) for binary Y . Section IV is devoted to
the same problem for continuous (X,Y ) when the privacy
filter is an additive-noise channel.
II. STRONG ESTIMATION PRIVACY GUARANTEE
Consider the scenario where Alice observes Y which is
correlated with a private random variable X , drawn from
a given joint distribution PXY , and wishes to transmit the
random variable Z to Bob to receive some utility from him.
Her goal is to maximize the utility while making sure that
Bob cannot efficiently estimate any non-trivial function of
X given Z . To formalize this privacy guarantee, we give the
following definition. In what follows random variables X , Y ,
and Z have alphabets X , Y , and Z , respectively, which are
either finite subsets of R or they are all equal to R.
Definition 1. Given a joint distribution PXY and ε ≥ 0,
Z is said to satisfy ε-strong estimation privacy, denoted as
Z ∈ Γε(PXY ), if there exists a random mapping (channel)
PZ∣Y that induces a joint distribution PX ×PZ∣X on X ×Z ,
via the Markov condition X ⊸− Y ⊸− Z , satisfying
mmse(f(X)∣Z) ≥ (1 − ε)var(f(X)), (1)
for any non-degenerate Borel functions f on X . Similarly, Z
is said to satisfy ε-weak estimation privacy, denoted as Z ∈
∂Γε(PXY ), if (1) is satisfied only for the identity function
f(x) = x.
In the sequel, we drop in the notation the dependence of
Γε(PXY ) on PXY and simply write Γε.
Suppose the utility Alice receives from Bob is var(Y )
mmse(Y ∣Z)
.
The utility is maximized (and is equal to ∞) when Z = Y
with probability one and is minimized (and is equal to one)
when Z is independent of Y . In order to quantify the tradeoff
between privacy guarantee (introduced above) and the utility,
we propose the following function, which we call the strong
privacy-aware estimation noise to signal ratio (ENSR):
sENSRε(X ;Y ) ∶= inf
Z∈Γε
mmse(Y ∣Z)
var(Y ) . (2)
Similarly, we can use weak estimation privacy to define the
weak privacy-aware ENSR as follows:
wENSRε(X ;Y ) ∶= inf
Z∈∂Γε
mmse(Y ∣Z)
var(Y ) . (3)
Remark 1. The quantity mmse(Y ∣Z)
var(Y ) is intimately related
to the correlation ratio, introduced by Rényi [21]. The
correlation ratio of Y on Z , denoted by ηZ(Y ), is defined
as
η2Z(Y ) ∶= var(E[Y ∣Z])
var(Y ) ,
which can be shown to be equal to supg ρ2(Y ; g(Z)), where
ρ is the standard correlation coefficient. It is clear from the
law of total variance that
mmse(Y ∣Z)
var(Y ) = 1 − η2Z(Y ).
In the sequel, we obtain an equivalent characterization for
the random mapping PZ∣X which generate Z ∈ Γε. To this
goal, we need the following definition.
Definition 2 ([21], [23]). Given random variables U and V
taking values over arbitrary alphabets U and V , respectively,
the maximal correlation ρm(U ;V ) is defined as
ρ2m(U ;V ) ∶= sup
f,g
ρ2(f(U), g(V ))
= sup
(f(U),g(V ))∈S0
E
2[f(U)g(V )]
var(f(U))var(g(V )) ,
where S0 is the collection of all pairs of real-valued
measurable functions f and g of U and V , respec-
tively, such that E[f(U)] = E[g(V )] = 0 and
0 < var(f(U)), var(g(V )) < ∞.
It can be shown that 0 ≤ ρm(U ;V ) ≤ 1 where the lower
bound is achieved if and only if U and V are independent
and the upper bound is achieved if and only if there exists a
pair of functions (f, g) ∈ S0 such that f(U) = g(V ) almost
surely. Rényi [21] derived an equivalent characterization of
maximal correlation as
ρ2m(U ;V ) = sup
f∈S0
U
E [E2[f(U)∣V ]]
var(f(U)) , (4)
where S0U is the collection of all real-valued measurable func-
tions f of U such that E[f(U)] = 0 and 0 < var(f(U)) <∞.
Theorem 1. For a given PXY , Z ∈ Γε if and only if
there exists PZ∣Y which induces PZ∣X via X ⊸− Y ⊸− Z
satisfying ρ2m(X ;Z) ≤ ε for any ε ≥ 0.
Proof. Consider a function f ∶ X → R. We can define
f˜(X) ∶= f(X) − E[f(X)] and since mmse(f˜(X)∣Z) =
mmse(f(X)∣Z) and var(f˜(X)) = var(f(X)), without loss
of generality, we can assume that E[f(X)] = 0. We can then
write
η2Z(f(X)) = E[E
2[f(X)∣Z]]
var(f(X)) (5)
Thus we obtain
inf
f∈S0
X
mmse(f(X)∣Z)
var(f(X)) = 1 − supf∈S0
X
η2Z(f(X)) (6)
(a)
= 1 − ρ2m(X ;Z), (7)
where (7) is due to (4).
If ρ2m(X ;Z) ≤ ε, then it is clear from (7) that
mmse(f(X)∣Z) ≥ (1 − ε)var(f(X))
and hence (1) is satisfied. Conversely, let PXZ satisfy the
ε-strong estimation privacy. Then for any f , (1) is satisfied.
Also, in view of (6) and (7) for arbitrary δ > 0, there exists
f ∈ S0X such that
1 − ε ≤
mmse(f(X)∣Z)
var(f(X)) ≤ 1 − ρ2m(X ;Z) + δ,
and hence,
ρ2m(X ;Z) ≤ ε + δ,
which completes the proof.
In light of Theorem 1 and Remark 1, we can write
sENSRε(X ;Z) and wENSRε(X ;Z) alternatively as
sENSRε(X ;Y ) = 1 − sup
PZ∣Y ∶ρ
2
m(X;Z)≤ε,
X⊸−Y⊸−Z
η2Z(Y ), (8)
and
sENSRε(X ;Y ) = 1 − sup
PZ∣Y ∶η
2
Z
(X)≤ε,
X⊸−Y⊸−Z
η2Z(Y ), (9)
for any ε ≥ 0. We note that, using the Support Lemma [10],
one can show the set Γε can be described only by considering
Z ∈ Z with ∣Z ∣ ≤ ∣Y ∣+1 in case Y is finite. We also note that
since both maximal correlation and correlation ratio satisfy
the data processing inequality [4], [7], [14], i.e. ρ2m(X ;Z) ≤
η2m(X ;Y ) and η2Z(X) ≤ η2Y (X) over X ⊸− Y ⊸− Z , we
can restrict our attention to 0 ≤ ε ≤ ρ2m(X ;Y ) and 0 ≤ ε ≤
η2Y (X) in (8) and (9), respectively.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF sENSRε(X ;Y ) AND
wENSRε(X ;Y ) FOR DISCRETE X AND Y
We first derive some properties of sENSRε(X ;Y ) and
wENSRε(X ;Y ) when both X and Y are discrete. For a given
PXY and 0 ≤ ε ≤ ρ2m(X ;Y ), we have the following trivial
bounds:
0 ≤ wENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ sENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ 1 − ε, (10)
where the last inequality can be proved by noticing that
sENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ sENSRε(Y ;Y ) and
mmse(Y ∣Z) = var(Y )(1 − η2Z(Y ))
≥ var(Y )(1 − ρ2m(Y ;Z)), (11)
where (11) follows from the definition of maximal corre-
lation. The lower bound 0 ≤ sENSRε(X ;Y ) in (10) is
achieved if and only if ρ2m(X ;Y ) = ε. This is because
sENSRε(X ;Y ) = 0 implies that there exists Z ∈ Γε such
that X ⊸− Y ⊸− Z and mmse(Y ∣Z) = 0 and hence Z = Y
almost surely and thus Y ∈ Γε. On the other hand, when
ε = 0, the upper bound sENSR0(X ;Y ) ≤ 1 is tight if and
only if all Z ∈ Γ0 are independent of Y . Hence, from [4,
Lemma 6], sENSR0(X ;Y ) = 1 if and only if X is not
weakly independent of Y . In particular, if ∣Y ∣ > ∣X ∣, then
sENSR0(X ;Y ) < 1, and if ∣Y ∣ = 2, then sENSR0(X ;Y ) = 1.
The map ε ↦ sENSRε(X ;Y ) is clearly non-increasing.
The following lemma states that this map is indeed convex
and thus strictly decreasing. As another consequence of this
convexity, we obtain an upper bound on sENSRε(X ;Y )
which strictly strengthens (10).
Lemma 1. For any joint distribution PXY , the maps
ε ↦ sENSRε(X ;Y ) and ε ↦ wENSRε(X ;Y ) are convex.
Proof. Here we give the complete proof for only
sENSRε(X ;Y ). The proof for wENSRε(X ;Y ) is similar and
hence is omitted. For brevity, in this proof we write sENSRε
instead of sENSRε(X ;Y ). It suffices to show that for any
0 ≤ ε1 < ε2 < ε3 ≤ ρ
2
m(X ;Y ), we have
sENSRε3 − sENSRε1
ε3 − ε1
≥
sENSRε2 − sENSRε1
ε2 − ε1
, (12)
which, in turn, is equivalent to
sENSRε2 ≤ (ε2 − ε1
ε3 − ε1
) sENSRε3 + (ε3 − ε2
ε3 − ε1
) sENSRε1 . (13)
Let PZ1 ∣Y ∶ Y → Z1 and PZ3 ∣Y ∶ Y → Z3 be two optimal
channels with Z1 ∈ Γε1 , Z3 ∈ Γε3 , and with disjoint output
alphabets Z1 and Z3, respectively.
We introduce an auxiliary binary random variable
U ∼ Bernoulli(λ), independent of (X,Y ), where λ ∶= ε2−ε1
ε3−ε1
and define the channel PZλ ∣Y : We pick PZ3 ∣Y if U = 1 and
PZ1 ∣Y if U = 0, and let Zλ be the output of this channel with
output alphabet Z1 ∪Z3. We then have
E[E2[f(X)∣Zλ]] = E [E[E2[f(X)∣Zλ]∣U]]
= λE[E2[f(X)∣Z3]]
+(1 − λ)E[E2[f(X)∣Z1]], (14)
where the second equality holds since U is independent of X .
We can then use the alternative characterization of maximal
correlation in (4) to write
ρ2m(X ;Zλ) = sup
f∈S0
X
E[E2[f(X)∣Zλ]]
E[f2(X)]
≤ λρ2m(X ;Z3) + (1 − λ)ρ2m(X ;Z1)
≤ λε3 + (1 − λ)ε1 = ε2,
where the first inequality follows from (14). Thus Zλ ∈ Γε2 .
On the other hand, we have
mmse(Y ∣Zλ) = E[Y 2] −E[E2[Y ∣Zλ]]
= E[Y 2] −E[E[E2[Y ∣Zλ∣U]]]
= λmmse(Y ∣Z3) + (1 − λ)mmse(Y ∣Z1),
and hence
sENSRε2 ≤
mmse(Y ∣Zλ)
var(Y )
=
λmmse(Y ∣Z3) − (1 − λ)mmse(Y ∣Z1)
var(Y )
= λsENSRε3 + (1 − λ)sENSRε1
which, according to (13), completes the proof.
In light of the convexity of ε ↦ sENSRε(X ;Y ) the
following corollaries are immediate.
Corollary 1. For a given PXY , the maps ε↦ 1−sENSRε(X;Y )ε
and ε↦ 1−wENSRε(X;Y )
ε
are non-increasing over (0,1).
Proof. Consoider the map ε ↦ sENSR0(X ;Y ) −
sENSRε(X ;Y ). In view of Lemma 1, this map is concave
and consequently the chordal slope sENSR0(X;Y )−sENSRε(X;Y )
ε
is decreasing in ε. It therefore follows that
1 − sENSRε(X ;Y )
ε
=
1 − sENSR0(X ;Y )
ε
+
sENSR0(X ;Y ) − sENSRε(X ;Y )
ε
,
is decreasing. The proof for wENSRε(X ;Y ) follows simi-
larly.
Corollary 2. For a given PXY ,
sENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ 1 − 1
ρ2m(X ;Y ) min{ε, ρ
2
m(X ;Y )},
and
wENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ 1 − 1
η2Y (X) min{ε, η
2
Y (X)}.
Proof. Since ε ↦ sENSRε(X ;Y ) is convex, it is al-
ways below the chord connecting (0, sENSR0(X ;Y )) and(ρ2m(X ;Y ),0), and hence
sENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ sENSR0(X ;Y )(1 − ε
ρ2m(X ;Y )) ,
from which the result follows because sENSR0(X ;Y ) ≤ 1.
The proof for wENSRε(X ;Y ) is similar.
X PY ∣X Y
e
Zδ
Fig. 1. The channel that achieves the upper bound in Corollary 2
where Zδ is the output of an erasure channel with erasure probability
specified in (15).
Remark 2. Note that simple calculations reveal that the upper
bounds in Corollary 2 are achieved by an erasure channel (see
Fig. 1). For example, the erasure channel that achieves the
upper bound of sENSRε(X ;Y ) is
PZ∣Y (z∣y) = { 1 − δ˜, if z = y
δ˜, if z = e,
for all y ∈ Y and the erasure probability
δ˜ = 1 −
ε
ρ2m(X ;Y ) , (15)
for 0 ≤ ε ≤ ρ2m(X ;Y ). This is because for the channel PZδ ∣Y ,
illustrated in Fig. 1, we have ρ2m(X ;Zδ) = (1−δ)ρ2m(X ;Y )
and ρ2m(Y ;Zδ) = 1 − δ. Therefore, if δ = δ˜, defined in (15),
Zδ˜ ∈ Γε. A simple calculation verifies that for this channel
mmse(Y ∣Zδ˜) = var(Y )δ˜ = var(Y )(1 − ερ2m(X ;Y )) .
A. Binary Input Symmetric Output PX ∣Y
We now turn our attention to the special case where
PX ∣Y belongs to a family of channels called binary-input
symmetric-output (BISO) channels, see e.g., [12], [24]. For
Y ∼ Bernoulli(p), PX ∣Y is BISO if, for any x ∈ X ={0,±1,±2, . . . ,±k}, we have PX ∣Y (x∣1) = PX ∣Y (−x∣0). This
clearly implies that p0 ∶= PX ∣Y (0∣0) = PX ∣Y (0∣1). As pointed
out in [24], one can always assume that the output alphabet
X = {±1,±2, . . . ,±k} has even number of elements by
splitting the symbol 0 into two symbols and assigning equal
probabilities. This family of channels can also be charac-
terized using the definition of quasi-symmetric channels [1,
Definition 4.17]. A channel W is BISO if (after making ∣X ∣
even) the transition matrix PX ∣Y can be partitioned along its
columns into binary-input binary-output sub-arrays in which
rows are permutations of each other and the column sums are
equal. For example, binary symmetric channels and binary
erasure channels are both BISO.
In the following theorem, we show that wENSRε(X ;Y )
can be calculated in closed-form when PX ∣Y is a BISO
channel.
Theorem 2. Let Y ∼ Bernoulli(p) and PX ∣Y be a BISO
channel. Then for 0 ≤ ε ≤ ρ2m(X ;Y ), we have
wENSRε(X ;Y ) = 1 − ε var(X)
4var(Y )E2[X ∣Y = 1] ,
and
1−ε
var(X)
4var(Y )E2[X ∣Y = 1] ≤ sENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ 1−
ε
ρ2m(X ;Y ) .
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Similar to [7], we also consider the tradeoff between
strong estimation privacy and the probability of correctly
guessing Y . To quantify this, let Yˆ ∶ Z → Y be the Bayes
decoding map. The resulting (minimum) error probability is
Pr(Yˆ (Z) ≠ Y ). Let
P
e
ε(X ;Y ) ∶= min
Z∈∂Γε
Pr(Yˆ (Z) ≠ Y ). (16)
Note that when Z is independent of Y , then the optimal
Bayes decoding map yields Pr(Yˆ (Z) ≠ Y ) = 1 − p, if p =
PY (1) ≥ 12 . Using a similar argument as [8, Appendix A],
we can establish the following connection between Peε(X ;Y )
and wENSRε(X ;Y ).
Proposition 1. Let Y ∼ Bernoulli(p) for p ≥ 1
2
. Then we
have
wENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ Peε(X ;Y )
var(Y ) ≤ 2wENSRε(X ;Y )
Proof. First note that
E[Y ∣Z = z] = PY ∣Z(1∣z) = pP+(z)(1 − p)P−(z) + pP+(z) ,
where P+(z) ∶= PZ∣Y (z∣ + 1) and P−(z) ∶= PZ∣Y (z∣ − 1). It
follows that
mmse(Y ∣Z) = ∑
z∈Z
∑
y∈{0,1}
PY Z(y, z)E[(y −E[Y ∣Z = z])2]
= p(1 − p)∑
z∈Z
P−(z)P+(z)(1 − p)P−(z)+ pP+(z)
= p(1 − p)[ ∑
z∈Z+
P−(z)P+(z)(1 − p)P−(z)+ pP+(z)
+ ∑
z∈Z−
P−(z)P+(z)(1 − p)P−(z)+ pP+(z)],
where Z− = {z ∈ Z ∶ (1 − p)P−(z) ≥ pP+(z)} and Z+ = {z ∈
Z ∶ pP+(z) ≥ (1 − p)P−(z)}. Since
Pr(Yˆ (Z) ≠ Y ) = p ∑
z∈Z−
P+(z) + (1 − p) ∑
z∈Z+
P−(z),
we then have
1
2
Pr(Yˆ (Z) ≠ Y ) ≤ mmse(Y ∣Z) ≤ Pr(Yˆ (Z) ≠ Y ),
from which the result follows immediately.
Calmon et al. [7] considered the same problem for X = Y ,
i.e., minimizing Pr(Xˆ(Z) ≠ X) over all PZ∣X such that
ρ2m(X ;Z) ≤ ε and showed that the best privacy-constrained
error probability is lower bounded by a straight line of ε with
negative slope. Combining Theorem 2 and Proposition 1, we
can lower bound Peε(X ;Y ) for all BISO PX ∣Y by a straight
1
−1
1
0
1 − α
1 − α
1
0
e
1 − δ˜
1 − δ˜
Fig. 2. Optimal privacy filter where PY ∣X = BSC(α) with Y ∼
Bernoulli( 1
2
) where δ˜ is specified in (17).
line in ε as follows:
P
e
ε(X ;Y ) ≥ var(Y ) − ε var(X)
4E2[X ∣Y = 1] ,
which generalizes [7, Corollaries 3,5].
In the following, we consider two examples of BISO
channels for which the bounds in Theorem 2 coincide.
First consider PX ∣Y being a binary symmetric channel with
crossover probability α, denoted as BSC(α).
Lemma 2. For Y ∼ Bernoulli(p) and PX ∣Y = BSC(α) for
α ∈ [0, 1
2
), we have for 0 ≤ ε ≤ ρ2m(X ;Y ),
1 −
εvar(X)
4(1 − 2α)2var(Y ) ≤ sENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ 1 −
ε
ρ2m(X ;Y ) ,
and
var(Y )− εvar(X)
4(1 − 2α)2 ≤ Peε(X ;Y ) ≤ 2 [var(Y ) −
εvar(X)
4(1 − 2α)2 ] .
Moreover, if p = 1
2
,
sENSRε(X ;Y ) = wENSRε(X ;Y ) = 1 − ε(1 − 2α)2 ,
and the optimal channel is BEC(δ˜) (Fig. 2) where
δ˜ = 1 −
ε
(1 − 2α)2 . (17)
Proof. Since X = {−1,+1}, it is straightforward to see that
E[X ∣Y = 1] = 1 − 2α, and 4var(Y )(1 − 2α)2 = var(X) −
4α(1−α), and for a fixed 0 ≤ α < 1
2
, ρ2m(X ;Y ) ≤ (1−2α)2,
which is tight if and only if p = 0.5. The results follow
from Theorem 2 and Proposition 1. Since for p = 0.5, the
upper bound of Corollary 2 is achieved, hence according to
Remark 2, the optimal privacy filter is an erasure channel
with erasure probability (17).
We next consider PX ∣Y being a binary erasure channel
with erasure probability δ, denoted as BEC(δ).
Lemma 3. For Y ∼ Bernoulli(p) and PX ∣Y = BEC(δ) for
δ ∈ [0,1), we have for 0 ≤ ε ≤ ρ2m(X ;Y ),
1 −
εvar(X)
4var(Y )(1 − δ)2 ≤ sENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ 1 −
ε
1 − δ
,
and
var(Y ) − εvar(X)
4(1 − δ)2 ≤ Peε(X ;Y ) ≤ 2 [var(Y ) −
εvar(X)
4(1 − δ)2 ] .
1-1
0
1
0
1 − δ
1 − δ
1
-1
0
1 − δ˜
1 − δ˜
Fig. 3. Optimal privacy filter where PX ∣Y = BEC(δ) with
Y ∼ Bernoulli( 1
2
) where δ˜ is specified in (18).
Moreover, if p = 1
2
,
sENSRε(X ;Y ) = 1 − ε
1 − δ
,
and the optimal channel is BEC(δ˜) (Fig. 3) where
δ˜ = 1 −
ε
1 − δ
. (18)
Proof. Since X = {−1,0,+1}, it is easy to show that
E[X ∣Y = 1] = 1−δ, and 4(1−δ)2var(Y ) = var(X)−δ(1−δ),
and ρ2m(X ;Y ) = 1 − δ. When p = 0.5, then var(X) = 1 − δ.
Here, again, we see that for uniform Y , sENSRε(X ;Y )
achieves the bound given in Corollary 2 and hence again,
according to Remark 2, the erasure channel is an optimal
privacy filter.
We conclude this section by connecting the above results to
the initial efficiency. For BISO channels, we define the initial
efficiency3 of fε(X ;Y ) ∶= var(Y ) − var(Y )wENSRε(X ;Y )
with respect to ε as the derivative f ′0(X ;Y ) of ε↦ fε(X ;Y )
at ε = 0. In fact, f ′0(X ;Y ) quantifies the decrease of
mmse(Y ∣Z) when ε slightly increases from 0. Then since
for any BISO PX ∣Y , f0(X ;Y ) = 0, using Corollary 1 and
the convexity of ε↦ wENSRε(X ;Y ), we can write
f ′0(X ;Y ) = lim
ε↓0
fε(X ;Y )
ε
= sup
ε>0
fε(X ;Y )
ε
= var(X) max
PZ∣Y ∶
X⊸−Y⊸−Z
var(Y ) −mmse(Y ∣Z)
var(X) −mmse(X ∣Z) .
We can, therefore, conclude from Theorem 2 that for a given
pair of random variables (X,Y ) with BISO PX ∣Y , we have
max
PZ∣Y ∶
X⊸−Y⊸−Z
var(Y ) −mmse(Y ∣Z)
var(X) −mmse(X ∣Z) =
1
4E2[X ∣Y = 1] .
B. sENSRε(X ;Y ) and wENSRε(X ;Y ) with n i.i.d. obser-
vations
Let (Xn, Y n) be n i.i.d. copies of (X,Y ) with a given
distribution PXY . Similar to (2) and (3), we can define
sENSRε(Xn;Y n) ∶= 1 − 1
n
sup
Z∈Γ⊗nε
n
∑
i=1
η2Zn(Yi)
3Initial efficiency was previously defined for the common randomness
problem in [30], for secret key generation in [15], for incremental growth
rate in a stock market [11], for source coding problems with side information
in [5], and for information extraction under privacy constraint in [4].
and
wENSRε(Xn;Y n) ∶= 1 − 1
n
sup
Z∈∂Γ⊗nε
n
∑
i=1
η2Zn(Yi)
where Zn ∶= (Z1, . . . , Zn), and
Γ⊗nε ∶= {PZn ∣Y n ∶ ρ2m(Xn;Zn) ≤ ε},
and
∂Γ⊗nε ∶= {PZn ∣Y n ∶
n
∑
i=1
η2Zn(Xi) ≤ nε}.
Using a technique developed in [6], we can directly show
that sENSR0(X ;Y ) < 1 if and only if the smallest singular
value, σmin , of the operator f(X) ↦ E[f(X)∣Y ] is zero.
Now if we consider the operator f(Xn) ↦ E[f(Xn)∣Y n]
for i.i.d. (Xn, Y n), we can see that the smallest singular
value is σn
min
(see, e.g., [14], [19]). It therefore follows that
unless σmin = 1, limn→∞ sENSR0(Xn;Y n) < 1 for any dis-
tribution PXY . This can also be seen from the Slepian-Wolf
theorem [9, Theorem 15.4.1] and specifically [25, Lemma 1].
The following result implies that the optimal privacy filter
PZn ∣Y n which achieves non-trivial perfect privacy cannot be
a memoryless channel.
Proposition 2. Let (Xn, Y n) be an i.i.d. copies of (X,Y )
with distribution PXY . If the family of feasible stochastic
kernels in the optimization (8) is constrained to be of the
form PZn ∣Y n(zn∣yn) =∏ni=1 Pi(zi∣yi), then
sENSRε(Xn;Y n) = sENSRε(X ;Y ),
wENSRε(Xn;Y n) = wENSRε(X ;Y ).
Proof. It is clear that sENSRε(Xn;Y n) is at most as
large as sENSRε(X ;Y ), and therefore we will only
show sENSRε(Xn;Y n) ≥ sENSRε(X ;Y ) (similarly for
wENSRε(X ;Y )). Let εi = ρ2m(Xi;Zi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
From the tensorization property of maximal correlation [27],
we know that ρm(Xn;Zn) = max{ρm(Xi;Zi)} and hence
PZn ∣Y n ∈ Γ
⊗n
ε if and only if εi ≤ ε for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We can
then write
1 −
1
n
n
∑
i=1
η2Zn(Yi) = 1
nvar(Y )
n
∑
i=1
mmse(Yi∣Zn)
=
1
nvar(Y )
n
∑
i=1
mmse(Yi∣Zi)
≥
1
n
n
∑
i=1
sENSRεi(X ;Y )
≥ sENSRε(X ;Y ),
where the last inequality is due to the fact that ε ↦
sENSRε(X ;Y ) is decreasing. It therefore follows that
sENSRε(Xn;Y n) ≥ sENSRε(X ;Y ).
To prove the same result for wENSRε(Xn;Y n), let now
η2Zi(Xi) ≤ εi or equivalently mmse(Xi∣Zi) ≥ (1−εi)var(X)
for 0 ≤ εi ≤ 1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n; hence PZn ∣Y n ∈ ∂Γ⊗nε if
∑ni=1 εi = nε. We can write
1 −
1
n
n
∑
i=1
η2Zn(Yi) = 1
nvar(Y )
n
∑
i=1
mmse(Yi∣Zn)
=
1
nvar(Y )
n
∑
i=1
mmse(Yi∣Zi)
≥
1
n
n
∑
i=1
wENSRεi(X ;Y )
≥ wENSRε(X ;Y ),
where the last inequality is due to the convexity of ε ↦
wENSRε(X ;Y ).
IV. CONTINUOUS (X,Y ), ADDITIVE GAUSSIAN NOISE
AS PRIVACY FILTER
In this section, we assume X and Y are both absolutely
continuous random variables and the channel PZ∣Y is mod-
elled by a scaled additive stable4 noise variable Nf which
is independent of (X,Y ) and has density f with zero mean
and unit variance, i.e.,
Zγ = Y + γNf ,
for some γ ≥ 0. We then define
sENSR
f
ε (X ;Y ) ∶= 1 − sup
γ∈Cε(PXY )
η2Zγ (Y ),
and similarly
wENSR
f
ε (X ;Y ) ∶= 1 − sup
γ∈∂Cε(PXY )
η2Zγ(Y ),
where
Cε(PXY ) ∶= {γ ≥ 0 ∶ ρ2m(X ;Zγ) ≤ ε},
and
∂Cε(PXY ) ∶= {γ ≥ 0 ∶ η2Zγ (X) ≤ ε}.
If the noise process is Gaussian N(0,1), we de-
note Nf , sENSR
f
ε (X ;Y ), and wENSRfε (X ;Y ) by NG,
sENSRε(X ;Y ), and wENSRε(X ;Y ), respectively.
The bounds for wENSRε(X ;Y ) obtained in (10) clearly
hold:
0 ≤ wENSR
f
ε (X ;Y ) ≤ sENSRfε (X ;Y ) ≤ 1 − ε,
and, in particular, sENSRf0(X ;Y ) ≤ 1. In the following, we
show that this last inequality is in fact an equality.
Proposition 3. For a given absolutely continuous (X,Y ),
the map ε ↦ sENSRfε (X ;Y ) is non-negative, strictly de-
creasing and satisfies
lim
ε↓0
sENSR
f
ε (X ;Y ) = 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of [4, Theorem 6]
and is hence omitted.
4A random variable X with distribution P is called stable if for X1, X2
i.i.d. according to P , for any constants a, b, the random variable aX1+bX2
has the same distribution as cX+d for some constants c and d [18, Chapter
1].
Example 1. Let (X,Y ) be jointly Gaussian with correlation
coefficient ρ and let Nf = NG. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that E[X] = E[Y ] = 0. It is known [21] that
ρ2m(X ;Zγ) = ρ2(X ;Zγ) and hence
ρ2m(X ;Zγ) = ρ2 var(Y )
var(Y ) + γ2 ,
which implies that γ ↦ ρ2m(X ;Zγ) is strictly decreasing and
hence ρ2m(X ;Zγ) = ε for 0 ≤ ε ≤ ρ2m(X ;Y ) = ρ2 has a
unique solution
γ2ε ∶= var(Y )(ρ
2
ε
− 1)
and Zγ ∈ Γε for any γ ≥ γε. On the other hand,
mmse(Y ∣Zγ) = var(Y ) γ2var(Y )+γ2 which shows that the map
γ ↦ mmse(Y ∣Zγ) is strictly increasing and hence
sENSRε(X ;Y ) = mmse(Y ∣Zγε)
var(Y ) = 1 −
ε
ρ2
. (19)
It is easy to check that that η2Zε(X) = ρ2m(X ;Zε) = ε This
then implies that for the jointly Gaussian (X,Y ), Cε(PXY ) =
∂Cε(PXY ), i.e., the ε-strong estimation privacy (1) coincides
with the ε-weak estimation privacy when Y is perturbed by
Gaussian noise. It then follows that for 0 ≤ ε ≤ ρ2
sENSRε(X ;Y ) = wENSRε(X ;Y ) = 1 − ε
ρ2
. (20)
This example suggests that the bound in Corollary 2 still
holds for absolutely continuous (X,Y ) in this model. We
prove this observation in the following lemma with the
assumption that N = NG.
Lemma 4. For a given absolutely continuous (X,Y ), we
have for 0 ≤ ε ≤ ρ2m(X ;Y )
wENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ sENSRε(X ;Y ) ≤ 1 − ε
ρ2m(X ;Y ) .
Proof. It suffices to prove the upper bound as the lower
bound follows immediately from (10). Let Bε(PXY ) ∶= {γ ≥
0 ∶ ρ2m(Y ;Zγ) ≤ ερ2m(X;Y )}. The strong data processing
inequality for maximal correlation [4, Lemma 4] states that
ρ2m(X ;Zγ) ≤ ρ2m(X ;Y )ρ2m(Y ;Zγ) and therefore implies
Bε(PXY ) ⊆ Cε(PXY ). Therefore
inf
γ∈Cε(PXY )
mmse(Y ∣Zγ) ≤ inf
γ∈Bε(PXY )
mmse(Y ∣Zγ)
= var(Y )(1 − ε
ρ2m(X ;Y )) ,
where the equality follows form (11).
Combined with (20), this lemma also shows that among
all (X,Y ) with identical maximal correlation, the jointly
Gaussian (XG, YG) yields the largest sENSRε(X ;Y ) when
the noise process is Gaussian. This observation is similar to
[28, Theorem 12] which states that for Gaussian noise, the
Gaussian input is the worst with no privacy constraint im-
posed, i.e., mmse(Y ∣Y +NG) ≤ mmse(YG∣YG+NG) where YG
has the same variance as Y . Conversely, Wu et al. [28] also
showed that for Gaussian input Y , additive Gaussian noise is
the worst, i.e., mmse(YG∣YG+N) ≤ mmse(YG∣YG+NG) where
NG is Gaussian having the same variance as N . These dual
results are essentially the same by switching Y to N because
mmse(Y ∣Y + N) = mmse(N ∣Y + N). However, in our
context, the noise variance is the parameter of optimization,
and hence the dual of Lemma 4 is not clear.
We can also obtain a lower bound on sENSRε(X ;Y ) when
only Y is Gaussian.
Lemma 5. Let X be jointly distributed with Gaussian YG.
Then,
1 −
ε
ρ2(X ;YG) ≤ sENSRε(X ;YG) ≤ 1 −
ε
ρ2m(X ;YG) ,
Proof. First note that
ρ2m(X ;YG + γNG) ≥ ρ2(X ;YG + γNG)
= ρ2(X ;YG)ρ2(YG;YG + γNG)
= ρ2(X ;YG) var(YG)
var(YG) + γ2
=∶ ζ(X ;YG).
Therefore we have
inf
γ∈Cε(X;YG)
mmse(YG∣YG + γNG) ≥ inf
ζ(X;YG)≥ε
γ2var(Y )
var(Y ) + γ2 ,
and hence
sENSRε(X ;YG) ≥ 1 − ε
ρ2(X ;YG) .
This lemma, together with Example 1, implies that
sENSRε(XG, YG) − sENSRε(X ;YG)
≤ ε [ 1
ρ2(X ;YG) −
1
ρ2m(X ;YG)]
for Gaussian XG which satisfies ρ2m(XG;YG) = ρ2m(X ;YG).
Assume that the difference ρ2m(X ;YG)−ρ2(X ;YG) is small.
Note that this does not necessarily mean that the distribution
of X is close to Gaussian. Nevertheless, this lemma illustrates
that sENSRε(X ;YG) is very close to sENSRε(XG;YG).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For Y ∼ Bernoulli(p), we have varb(Y ) ∶= var(PY ) =
p(1−p) and let var−1b ∶ [0, 14 ]→ [0, 12 ] be its inverse function.
Due to the Markovity condition X ⊸− Y ⊸− Z , we can write
PX ∣Z(x∣z) = PX ∣Y (x∣1)PY ∣Z(1∣z)+ PX ∣Y (x∣0)PY ∣Z(0∣z).
(25)
Note that for X supported over X = {±1,±2, . . . ,±k}, the
variance can be written as
var(X) = k∑
i=1
i2[PX(i)+PX(−i)]−[ k∑
i=1
i[PX(i)− PX(−i)]]
2
.
(26)
We can expand mmse(X ∣Z) as in (23) where (a) is a
simple application of (26), (b) follows from the Markovity
condition (25) and the definition of BISO, and in (c) we used
the fact that var−1b (u) = 12(1 −√1 − 4u) for any 0 ≤ u ≤ 14 .
We can therefore write mmse(Y ∣Z) linearly in terms
of mmse(X ∣Z) as in (24). Note that since for Z ∈ ∂Γε,
mmse(X ∣Z) ≥ (1 − ε)var(X), we can write
wENSRε(X ;Y ) = (1 − ε)var(X) − var(X ∣Y = 1)
4(E[X ∣Y = 1])2
=
var(X)− var(X ∣Y = 1)
4var(Y )E2[X ∣Y = 1]
−
εvar(X)
4var(Y )E2[X ∣Y = 1] . (27)
Note that, we have
pvar(X ∣Y = 1) + (1 − p)var(X ∣Y = 0) = E[var(X ∣Y )]
= var(X)− var(E[X ∣Y ]),
and consequently,
var(X)− var(X ∣Y = 1) = var(E[X ∣Y ])
+(1 − p)[var(X ∣Y = 0) − var(X ∣Y = 1)]
(a)
= var(E[X ∣Y ]) (28)
where (a) follows from the symmetry of the channel PX ∣Y .
Note that E[X ∣Y ] is a binary random variable which is equal
to E[X ∣Y = 1] with probability p and E[X ∣Y = 0] with
probability 1 − p. Due to the symmetry of the channel, one
can easily show that E[X ∣Y = 0] = −E[X ∣Y = 1]. It then
follows that
var(E[X ∣Y ]) = p(E[X ∣Y = 1])2 + (1 − p)(E[X ∣Y = 0])2
− [pE[X ∣Y = 1] + (1 − p)E[X ∣Y = 0]]2
= (E[X ∣Y = 1])2 − (E[X ∣Y = 1])2(2p − 1)2
= 4p(1 − p)(E[X ∣Y = 1])2
= 4var(Y )(E[X ∣Y = 1])2 (29)
Plugging (28) and (29) into (27), we can conclude that
wENSRε(X ;Y ) = 1 − εvar(X)
4var(Y )E2[X ∣Y = 1] . (30)
The bound for sENSRε(X ;Y ) simple follows from (30) and
Corollary 2.
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